Worked in the office nine hard hours today. Things are crazy for me right now . My standardized truck scale (shelved) project arose from the dead yesterday and morphed into a one-site rush job. The DSP is my #1 priority as of 2:30 PM today. Problems with this are: 1) our project processes changed a few weeks ago (again) and I’m not familiar with them yet (I get check-the-box training on them Tuesday) 2) Detroit wants to start using their bulk loader NOW but more acceptance testing is needed, then I have to catch up documentation before I can release it. 3) My Near Miss project is behind schedule 3 weeks. 4) MapEngineering croaked out Feb 25 and it was reported today. I requested to have EDS Wintel team engaged to delete a file (Can you believe I have to request an outside party to access an internal file for me? This is our model! We can’t trust our own employees. ) 5) TXC can’t view 50% of their PDFs – received authorization but now needs documentation before I can proceed to fix the problem. God this could go on all night. My mental list is usually 12 items or so….you should see my written list. This is my work – what I do.
I’m a circus performer! Maybe a magician at times! Sometimes it takes me 3 seconds to do what it takes somebody else 3 days to do. Sometimes people call me with “Help! I must do the impossible!!!!!” and I’m able to say, “Oh, give me a sec…..here ya go…”
My goodness that’s a powerful feeling!!! Computers and technology make miracles happen!
Problem Statement
The incident rate for fatal and serious injuries in the workplace has not improved as much as the incident rate for minor injuries. Conditions that cause harm are the same conditions that cause incidents where no harm results. Whether or not harm occurs from an incident or set of conditions is oftentimes a matter of luck. The general problem is that developing a culture that supports reporting near miss incidents and learning from them is challenging for many reasons (i.e. blame culture; fear from job security issues; time, expertise, and amount of work to analyze incidents and implement resolutions; negative management reactions; normalization of risk; perception that management doesn’t care) . The main problem is that changing safety culture takes time and depends on leadership. Leaders may decide to invest in near miss management systems to facilitate reporting, analysis, and continual improvement, but these investments may not yield intended benefits if the organization’s culture doesn’t or can’t use systems as intended. Transformational leadership and servant leadership are effective for building strong safety culture but the relationship of either of these with intent to report near miss incidents has not adequately been studied. Little empirical research has been published regarding intent to report near miss incidents, and few studies could be found that address which style might promote or predict incident reporting. Little empirical research has been conducted to determine how confidential or anonymous reporting may influence workers to report near miss incidents. A quantitative correlational study involving workers in industrial facilities in the United States may produce new information to improve understanding of the relationships between leadership style and intent to report near miss incidents, and the influence of confidentiality and anonymity on intent to report near misses.
Now, I am going back through the literature to support my statements here. All of this was gleaned from what I’ve been reading. For that paragraph, I have noted 11 sources, but I have to find a few more.
I’m learning my sources better and the thought of this makes me smile as I type. Am I finally mastering my topic? Maybe I’m becoming an eccentric old geek. It’s probably true.
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